Science Declares Our Universe IS Intelligently Designed
The original version is 99.89% grammatically correct and is no longer published. There may be a few original versions still available. The original version can be identified by noting that on page 5 in the last line the word is "mathematicians." If you have this version, it's important that you consider the
Original Version Typographical Variations (www.serve.com/herrmann/edition1.htm).
In order to sustain my record of never having published anything without, at the least, a few typographical errors, here are such errors that appear in the 99.98% grammatically correct first revision. First revision
I consider it as impossible for me to write a "complete" or "perfected" book in any aspect of science. All such material is partial in character since scientific models are either self-correcting or, at the least, can be descriptively refined. I could have spent the remainder of my life changing and altering the material in the book manuscript and, hence, it would never have been published. Indeed, the fact that it is published and not a complete incomprehensible "mess" is somewhat of a miracle since there were many attempts, external to Xulon Press, to scuttle the project. The purpose of the section is to present refinements and, if necessary, specific technical corrections as they become necessary. This will be done in page number order. What may not be as clearly indicated, as I would have liked, is the use of the expression GGU-model. This is technically a mathematical model, a mathematical theory, which models logic-system generated consequence operators for its development. It has a technical vocabulary. This model is then interpreted in terms of the idea of intelligent design and other interpretations. At particular points within this book, the actually GGU-model interpretation being considered may only be recognized by examining the immediate context.
In this book, I discuss the notion of the mathematical modeling of "abstract" objects by examples. The term "abstract" is used. But, rather than define it, the notion is illustrated in a particular context. Pure mathematics is a rational symbol manipulation game that follows specific rules. Abstract mathematics is pure mathematics and the term "abstract" has various meanings understood from the context. I often term the symbols as "abstract objects." Also the term "abstract model" has different meanings. In this book, it means a mathematic theory about symbol manipulation itself. That is, one investigates the notion of what constitutes the meaning of the term "rational" when one states that the symbols are being "rational combined." Then conclusions are referred back to the original physical meanings for the symbols. Most often, the rules for the symbol manipulation come from two sources. The symbols can "represent" specifically defined physical objects or processes. Then the manipulation rules are obtained by considering what appears as basic physical behavior or objects that leads to more complex behavior or objects. Often this basic physical feature is common to more than one natural-system and this is the scientific process of "abstraction." After the rules are rationally applied, using mathematical reasoning that can be specifically defined, the results are then applied to the physical world using the original physical objects or processes the symbols represented. But, pure mathematics itself can be "abstracted." There can manipulation rules that are common to other sets of manipulation rules. One then rational applies these common rules to develop a more general theory, a generalization, that applies to a collection of mathematical theories. For the Newton notion of "force and direction" (p. 34- ), an actually an abstract (non-specific) entity is employed. Specified directed line segments are used as a model. Why are they "abstract" in this sense? Since they can be used to model other physical entities and, actually, they need only satisfy a specific set of axioms. (One might consider these as "variables" in mathematics, but a variable is actually a "symbol" that represents members of a "specific" set. Variables can be considered as "representing" abstract objects. However, an abstract object can be unique.) Then there are the axioms for the abstract nitts, elins and the rail relation (p. 43 -). These meaningless strings of symbols can be used to represent many different real entities and one simply studies relations determined by the axioms. They are used to model the common behavior of many different specific real objects. The process of abstraction in mathematics is often defined as expressing the common features of a vast array of physical entities but, in general, it's meaning is much broader than this.
I am trying to show how pure mathematics can be applied to concrete real problems. For four names {1,2,3,4}, the grouping {1,2}, {1,3}, {1,4}, {2,3}, {2,4}, {3,4} satisfy the axioms and all the theorems deduced. Consider the therapist problem. He has 9 patients and he wishes to test his minimal contact theory. He wants them to meet in groups of 3, each patient to meet every other patient only once. This will occur if no two patients, as a couple, meet in a group more than once. The numbers fit the theorems stated and many others and axiom 3 and 5 seem to be his requirements. We give each patient a number from 1 - 9, the nitts. In general, there are 84 different 3 element subsets of {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9} and, if the theorems hold, we are looking for 12 of these. This might just be a challenge to determine. After some effort one might consider the collection {1,2,3}, {1,4,5}, {1,6,7}, {1,8,9}, {2,4,9}, {2,5,7}, {2,6,8}, {3,4,6}, {3,5,8}, {3,7,9}, {4,7,8}, {5,6,9}. Obviously, axioms 1, 2, 4, hold. The 36 different two member subsets appear once and only once in these elin and axiom 3 holds. You can check that axiom 5 holds as do the theorems, which helped me to find these 12 groupings.
What is a "consequence operator"? (p. 70 -) It should be self-evident that it is an abstract entity having no specifically defined constituents in that the internal structure is composed of abstract entities. I specifically mention that consequence operators are relations between members of ANY object language. I given many examples of different object languages. The language used for the GGU-model is constructed in a specific manner. But, even then, there are infinitely different object languages that can be constructed in this manner. Hence, the mathematical objects under my present usage that are related by a consequence operator are abstract entities. A consequence operator is a mathematical object that is axiomized to behavior in a specific manner. The axioms form an abstraction of basic aspects of the human thought machine (i.e. information into the mental "black-box" and information out). For the formal "logic" models, the X, Y and Z (p. 77 -), although they start as representations for actual real strings of symbols, become abstract symbols since they also can be used to model other notions, say, images, that are not necessary considered as finite strings of symbols. Constructions with abstract entities is introduced by considering "expressions" such that (X -> Y). So, I have illustrated how one models with abstract entities.
A natural-system as defined contains related specific constituents. But, the notion is abstracted relative to behavior. The VCR or DVD behavior discussed is a perfect illustration of the abstraction process (p. 93 -). First, you have specific entities. [Note: In this article "altered" behavior of a natural-system includes the production of a natural-system.] Many individuals are trained to consider alterations in natural-system behavior or characteristics by applying specific natural laws, specific processes and the like. Of course, they can also "evolve" in a so-called "random" manner. But, the notion of non-specific "change" is introduced as an ingredient and generally modeled. This "abstracts" the notion of the time-development of abstract natural-systems. Abstracting physical notions such as this is not usually part of ones basic training in scientific discourse. This non-specific abstract approach is necessary since the GGU-model is a cosmogony. It is not a cosmology. Indeed, the GGU-model can be considered as a "larger" more complex physical environment in which universes are embedded. A cosmology would be where you do define each natural-system specifically in terms of its "physical" constituents and relations.
Then all of these developing abstract natural-systems are "glued" together by an "ultimate ultraword" to form an (abstract) universe. Although I state that specific information is used for a specific universe, comprehension may be hindered due to the lack of actual specificity for an abstraction. I have not started at a "low enough" level, so to speak, and I have not introduced "specific" entities for the construction, as yet. The result of all of this yields a "master universe." (I note that the actual generation of the time developing natural-system is considerably more difficult to comprehend. I have used a slightly unacceptable simple approach in the book.)
If one looks at a paused VCR or DVD image, then rather than pushing the pause bottom to move to the next frame, one might decide that the next frame should be altered from the original. This process is what is modeled abstractly and discussed at length (p .110 -), but again the possible different alterations from the original are non-specific. The natural-systems obtained are still but abstract in character. This leads to a possibly new development for a natural-system and the combination of all such developments is a possible different universe. Now these are all analogue models for behavior (they represent behavior and proprties where the objects presented need be the actual objects used) and I mention that one does not need to assume that this is actually how it is done. Indeed, I mention how these universes can be obtained by applying the "randomness" notion and, in the minimal physical case (p. 183),> all of these universe constructions can be eliminated.
It's remarkable that when I write the symbols "GGU-model" or say General Grand Unification, some individuals drop the word "General." They minds jump to the other end of the spectrum and look for a "Grand Unification Theory" using specific entities. Not seeing one immediately discussed they put the book aside, or worst. The same is so with the General Intelligent Design interpretation. Their minds seem to jump to the local and restricted theory (RID) of Behe and Dambski, and RID's application to specific natural-system levels many, many orders below the natural-system we term as our universe.
And "after" all of this the model does reveal, all on its own, actual entities that are the fundamental somewhat specific ones from which everything can be constructed using to some degree the specificity mindset (p. 125). These fundamental entities are not part of our physical universe unless you extend the term "physical" to include all of the universes, the substratum and other aspects of the NSP-world. (The above 6 paragraphs added 11/9/06)
It is very important to realized that the "physical" GGU-model is just that a model. This model can be interpreted in many intermediate ways where only a few such interpretations appear in this book. One need never assume that the external universe processes or objects, when described in detail, need to exist as specified. One can accept such general statements as: "There are processes that when applied to objects produce, in a step-by-step manner, universes with all of their levels of complexities. Further, the processes allow for variations in natural-system behavior initiated by participator actions." I do not contend that the detailed descriptions for the processes or objects correspond to a form of reality. I only contend that the GGU-model's technical apparatus models a form of reality beyond our physically sensed universe. I contend that the fact that the physical GGU-model is testable and falsifiable and predicts all sensed natural-system behavior within our physical universe implies that all such predicted behavior is indirect evidence for its acceptance as a viable "model."
****For the GGU-model, these operators, when physically interpreted, are separated into three categories depending upon their construction. These are the N-processes, UN-processes and the IUN-processes. They represent collections of processes that produce natural-systems or ultranatural-events or alter natural-systems or characteristics, or yield other defined objects. The behavior of these operators is determined by strict mathematical means. In the physical interpretation, all notions relative to the intelligent design signatures are considered as extraneous and are ignored.**** (Added 1/25/07.)
The notion of indirect evidence is highly significant in physical model construction. Evidence "indirectly" indicates the existence or behavior of hypothesized entities if the assumptions used to construct the model lead to events that can be observed either by human or machine sensors. However, one can never assume, with complete confidence, that such hypothesized entities or processes actually exist in object reality. In general, the model can only be considered as analogue modeling entities or processes. This is especially the case where you have more than one model that yields descriptions for the same observed events. This is what often determines different science-communities, science-communities that accept different models that yield the same descriptions for the behavior of observed entities.
Relative to the GID-model interpretation, the basic hypotheses are verified billions of times a day. Further, this model is so highly scientific in character that whenever an individual conducts a scientific experiment and the experiment verifies an inductive or deductive statement, then this also verifies the GID interpreted GGU-model.
Please notice that there are various forms of "intelligent design" discussed in the book. They are the "metalogic intelligent design" represented by H and H and those that are represented by the designed standard or nonstandard consequence operators and other designed processes. Application of each specific consequence operator requires that intelligence be applied to a corresponding standard or nonstandard general logic-system. If the consequence operator is not first defined by a general logic-system, then the "intelligence aspects" models the mental processes that yield specific and fixed systemized collections of images. That is, that specific images correspond to other specific images via a fixed relation. This requires a form of intelligent finite choice. That is, for every image in the language, the specific finite choice of a unique image from a collection of images. However, this selection requirement is the major part of scientific deduction. Thus, in both cases, the application of a standard or nonstandard consequence operator, models aspects of "deduction." (Paragraph revised 1/23/07.)
****The General Intelligent Design interpretation is that the specific operators that produce the previously stated GGU-model results are each intelligently designed by H or H. The images obtained by applying such operators to a specific image are intelligently designed since the methods used to obtain the images satisfy all of the rules and axioms for standard (human) or higher forms of scientific deduction. Under this interpretation, such operators are often called "intelligent agents."****(Added 1/25/07.)
In general, for the GID interpretation, I show how the intelligent agent H and, more significantly, the higher intelligence H intelligently design every detailed aspect of universe construction and behavior of each natural-system contained therein. This includes the pre-designs and the designs of all controlling intelligent agents. If the intelligent agent terminology is removed, a pure physical model emerges. When interpreted theologically, it is highly probably that the necessarily incomplete physical model is similar to how God Biblically accomplishes this task in that the only humanly comprehensible model for His general creationary processes is the physical model. (Paragraph revised 11/27/04)
Since I use models for human mental behavior as the basis for the GGU-model and human beings can use numerously many different logic-systems for different purposes, the same holds if one considers a theological interpretation where a single entity can exhibit such intelligence at various levels. [Note: The abbreviation GID is now being used for the general intelligent design interpretation of the GGU-model.]
In general, when a general logic-system is used or a consequence operator applied, a great many extraneous results are obtained. The actual observations being predicted most then be choosen from among this extraneous information by an intelligent being. However, there are general logic-systems and corresponding consequence operators that eliminate all of this information and present only the actual real or assumed images. These operators are called "behavior-signatures" or "theory-signatures." They are discussed and defined in this paper. (Added 1/23/07)
In the GID interpretation, various consequence operators are termed "intelligent agents" and they have appropriate "intelligent design signatures." For any universe, the operator *S is the general operator that yields, in primitive time, each universe-wide frozen-frame. [Below, in the "Technical" heading, I give the most recent technical explanation as to how this can actually be accomplished.] It signifies that this primitive time process is produced, and sustained by a higher intelligence - a nonstandard intelligent agent. This process also produces the ultranatural events. The other operators discussed are relative to our universe and demonstrate how the universe-wide frozen-frames coalesce in primitive time to produce natural-system time developments. From the GID interpretation, intelligent agents that are but restrictions of a higher intelligence control such coalescence. The operator *S can be considered as displaying a general intelligent design signature where some other operators yield more specific intelligent design signatures. The general intelligent design signature increases in strength as other operators are adjoined to produce specific natural-system behavior. (Paragraph revised 1/1/03 and 9/17/04)
The ultranatural (Natural) world is a subset of the nonstandard physical world. Theologically, is the ultranatural the same as the supernatural? The real notion of "supernatural" first requires a list be accepted as to what constitutes the "natural." For the GGU-model, only standard mathematical models are considered as representing behavior taking place within a "natural" physical universe. This is the GGU-model's definition of the "natural." The model, as first conceived and used to solve the General Grand Unification Problem, requires all of the ultranatural to be considered as but a new "Natural" environment in which our universe is embedded. For the theological interpretation, the ultranatural can be considered as consisting of both the supernatural and new "natural" processes. For the Bible's theological intent, I consider almost all of the ultranatural, at least, as an interface between the supernatural and the physical world in which we dwell. Clearly, the higher intelligence H would signify a supernatural intelligence. But, depending upon the interpretation, the process *S may or may not be considered as a supernatural. The same could be said for other ultranatural processes. At, present, I do not consider them as such. The GGU-model rationally verifies the Biblical descriptions for a supernatural God's creationary activities as well as how He can intervene and alter all physical behavior or characteristics. Except relative to certain very general statements such as those related to a higher language and the like, the model gives no direct information about the workings of God's supernatural world. Rules for the application of these operators and the agent(s) that activate the various interface operators are, at least, considered as supernatural objects and further details can only be known via a supernatural higher language. (11/2/07)
[1] Entire Book. I have used the term specific information 97 times in this book. I have done so in various contexts so that the reader can gain an intuitive idea as to what this primitive notion entails. You can only comprehend a primitive entity by describing its properties rather than considering its composition Of considerable significance are the results that appear in Herrmann (1999d). This notion of specific information is partially described by many, but not all, of the Gitt information statements restricted to the behavior of natural-systems. This paper shows that general consequence operators basically model specific information as partially described by Gitt via forms of mental activity. All of the consequence operators discussed in this book are general consequence operators, where the nonstandard ones preserve these properties when restricted to what are called internal sets. This signifies that such standard and nonstandard consequence operators can be conceived of as preserving specific information as it is represented by the "images."
In this 1999 paper, I only discuss three levels of Gitt information. I show how consequence operators predict the major Gitt "theorems." Hence, these particular theorems are not merely empirical in character but have a standard and strong rational basis. Further, the notion of "specific information" is itself intelligently designed. I mentioned that the first two levels of information, the Shannon statistical level, which is not specific information, and the syntactic level do not appear to be controlled by consequence operators. However, this is not entirely correct. The statistical and the syntactical level both appear to be controlled by definable logic-systems. Hence, using the material in Herrmann (2001a), these logic-systems do generate consequence operators for these two levels. Consequently, I conclude that the standard and nonstandard consequence operators discussed in this book model (i.e. preserve the properties of) all of the notions of information, the non-specific statistical notion as well as all levels of Gitt information. (Paragraph last revised 5/25/05)
Gitt gives "general" statements (Theorems and Propositions) about information, and as restricted to specific natural-systems described some of the properties of specific information. Operationally, specific information can be more easily described. Consider a frozen-frame image for a specific natural-system at a moment of primitive time. Specific information is the "stuff" that "forces," so to speak, subparticles to combine and to form this exact frozen-frame.
I have devised a simple (if not trivial) analogue model for specific information, which also shows how it is related to logical processes. The basis for this is the image notion as displayed by a TV or computer screen. One can devise a displayable program that will allow the screen to show pigs flowing over Washington DC. The program represents the instructions or laws that would require this behavior. Although the program language is fixed, an alteration in the program leads to an alteration in pig behavior. However, it is the inner logical workings of the computer that would translate these programs into the images on the screen. It is the inner logical workings restricted to specific instructions that are guided by the "specific information" contained within the programs and this leads to the displayed images. The reason I wrote "contained within the programs" is that these inner workings would not function in this manner unless the instructions were presented in a translatable program language and, of course, translated in such a manner that yields specific actions. You could consider the "translation into appropriate action" process and the results of this translation process as an analogue model for the "operational content" of the specific information contained within the programs. (Of course, although not completely necessary, it can be rationally assumed that specific information is contained in the "mind" of the programmer and is simply represented by the specific "written" program.) Thus, following this logical analogy, in the natural world and using the subparticle notion, a consequence operator (ultralogic) applied to an ultraword, yields the operational content for the specific information contained within the ultraword. Thus, the notion of specific information is further understood not as you would a material entity but rather operationally. For an intuitive discussion about the GID-model higher intelligence interpretation and ultralogics, see ultralogic and for ultrawords, see ultraword. (Paragraph revised 4/22/04, 10/7/06)
Additionally, it may help comprehension to consider quantum physics. With respect to quantum particle or field physics, there is assumed to be primitive (i.e. fundamental) entities that follow patterns of behavior dictated by collections of symbols or images called the "laws of nature." The question relative to such patterns of behavior is what compels the primitive entities to follow or obey, so to speak, these laws of nature rather than behave in radically different ways? The same question can be posed at each level of the configured hierarchies that lead to macroscopic and large-scale behavior. Whatever this immaterial mysterious "stuff" is I term it as "specific information." However, as indicated, such behavior can be further described from the viewpoint of subparticle theory, primitive time and the physical GGU-model. In this case, specific information is the immaterial stuff that produces all of the subparticle combinations with specific configurations and yields every level of a universe-wide frozen-frame that is then realized. From pure physical point of view, the statement that specific information is a primitive means that one cannot describe it as composed of other entities. I mention that this "stuff" does have at least one theological interpretation relative to the Divine "mind." (Paragraph added 5/25/05)
[1a Page 7. Natural-system "behavior" also includes the notion of various "characteristics" that may need to be measured or that are but assumed. For example, energy, velocity, spin, momentum, etc. (5/15/06)
[2] Page 68. The logic-systems being considered here are now called finite logic-systems in that the set of rules of reference is a finite set of n-ary relations. I have recently extended logic systems to include the case with the set of n-ary relations is not finite. For a given language, both types of logic-systems are called general logic-systems. I have shown in the paper "General Logic-systems and Consequence Operators" that there are non-finite logic-systems that correspond to finite consequence operators and such operators looked at in the most general way are finite consequence operators if and only if they are generated (defined) by a general logic-system. Importantly, there are other ways to describe deduction from premises and a fix set or members from the language (i.e. a 1-ary relation). Indeed, although it is equivalent to a general logic-system with the general rules of reference, one way is the usual way that appears when an individual reads a claimed deduction from premises. The actual rules of inferences are not stated in this method. Simple consider a set of fixed finite lists (steps) that use the premises or members of the 1-ary set to from a deduction using members from the same language as steps and the last step in the list is declared a deduction from the premises or 1-ary set. Within this collection of lists are all of the one-step lists that model the allowed insertion process as stated at the bottom of page 67. Using just this collection of allowed finite lists that lead to the allowed deductions, a finite consequence operator exists that will generate the same deductive results. (12/8/05)
[3] Pages 71-74. First notice that as stated (1) does not include the additional requirement for (I) (page 69), that P be a subset of C(P). Although this requirement is stated, it should be include it in (1). As implied at the top of p. 71, of considerable significance is the fact that, for application to actual real physical events, the natural laws, as here defined, and scientific theories must be specified so as to include a specific moment in primitive or observer time if observer time is increasing. The logic-system that generates a consequence operator and that is applied to a specific natural-system must contain statements that identify the natural-system relative to a "time" notion. This requirement is usually implicitly known but would need to be explicitly contained within any logic-system the produces or alters natural-system behavior, or produces or alters natural-system characteristics. Indeed, this is a basic requirement for application of scientific theories to any natural-system. If such an identification is not included, then it is possible that the theory would contradict axiom (2) and, hence, it would not be a properly constructed scientific theory. It is rather self-evident that to apply natural laws and scientific theories to the events sequences this requirement must also be met. Hence, technically, applicable logic-systems and their corresponding consequence operators differ in, at least, this one respect for each moment in primitive or observer time. (Added 2/13/07) Revised 3/17/08.
Certain science-community logic-systems do not follow the same patters as those presented within (internal to) a mathematical theory. They can be modeled mathematically, where the arguments are rather dialectic in character, and this can lead to binary logic-system formed by simply making pronouncements. In this regard, I note that the type of unification that is modeled by J yields a logic-system that forces the hypotheses {a,b} to be J-inconsistent, where they are A and B-consistent. A({a,b}) = {a,b,c}, B({a,b}) = {a,b,d}. However, J({a,b}} = {a,b,c,d,e}.
Is there a rule that a science-community would need to use or exclude for their K mode of logical deduction? Using logic-system rules, the reason why K is not a consequence operator is that one is allowed to use the previously obtained value "d" in the (d,e) relation to obtain the value "e." The operation that has defined K does not allow this. This shows that for this example what a science-community must exclude in their deductive processes that would lead to K (partially) falsifying GID. Note that consequence operators can be defined without first defining a logic-system. [See math.LO/9911204 Definition 2.4.] However, every consequence operator defined on a finite language L determines a logic-system, as I have defined it, which will yield the same consequence operator. If L is infinite, then to make such a correspondence the definition of a logic-system can be extended easily to the general logic-system and this will always correspond to a finite consequence operator and conversely. [See this URL math/0512559.] Because the "inserting" rule is being used, one of the simplest methods to generator a corresponding logic-system is easily described.
Let L = {a,b,c,d, . . .} and C be a consequence operator defined on L. For the empty subset E of L, use C(E) as a 1-ary (unary) relation. For singleton subsets, (i.e. {y}}, define the binary relations {(a,x)| x in C({a}) }, {(b,x)| x in C({b}) }, . . . . For doubleton subsets define relations {(a,b,x)| x in C({a,b}) }, {(a,c,x)| x in C({a,c}) }, . . . {(b,c,x)| x in C({b,c}) }, {(b,d,x)| x in C({b,d}) }, . . . {(a,b,c,x)| x in C({a,b,c}) }, . . . . The logic-system you get need not be the same as the original one. For example, the original logic-system for L may not include any binary relations and, as is usual, no n-ary relations (n >2) with any repeated members in the first n-1 coordinates. Then the binary relations this method generates are {(a,a)}, {(b,b)}, {(c,c}), {(d,d)}, {(e,e)} which simply models the inserting process. Also notice the due to our choice method, it isn't necessary to consider such relations as (b,a,x). More specifically, let L = {a,b,c} and your logic-system is {(b,c)}. Let C' be the corresponding consequence operator. We need only consider the values of C' that cannot be obtained merely by inserting hypotheses and these are C'({b}) = {b,c}, C'({a,b}) = {a,b,c}, C'({b,d}) = {b,c,d}, C'({a,b,d}) {a,b,c,d}. Now apply the above process. Then for the relations we have {(a,a),(b,b),(b,c),(c,c),(d,d)}, {(a,b,c),(b,d,c)}, {(a,b,d,c)}. Even if we eliminate those relations that model inserting, we have a different logic-system {(b,c),(a,b,c),(b,d,c),(a,b,d,c)}. This extended logic-system appears be one where we do not need to apply the procedure where we use previously "deduced" members of L to obtain other "deduced" members. Does this fact contradict the above reason as to why K is not a consequence operator?
The facts are that the above example is too simplistic to make such a generalization. This generation method can be used for any set function such as K and gives the needed additional insight as to why K is not a consequence operator. All we need to consider for K are the values K({d}) = {d,e}, K({a,b}) = {a,b,c,d}, K({a,d}) = {a,d,e}, K({b,d}) = {b,d,e}, K({c,d}} = {c,d,e}, K({a,b,c}) = {a,b,c,d}, K({b,c,d}) = {b,c,d,e}, K({a,b,d}) = {a,b,c,d,e}, K({a,c,d}) = {a,c,d,e}, K({a,b,e}) = {a,b,c,d,e}, K({b,c,d}) = {b,c,d,e}, K({a,b,c,d}) = {a,b,c,d,e}, K({a,b,c,e}) = {a,b,c,d,e}, K({a,b,d,e}) = {a,b,c,d,e}. The non-trivial portion of the logic-system corresponding to these values is {(d,e)}, {(a,b,c),(a,b,d),(a,d,e),(b,d,e),(c,d,e)}, {(a,b,c,d),(a,b,d,c), (a,b,d,e),(a,b,e,c),(a,b,e,d),(a,c,d,e),(b,c,d,e)}, {(a,b,c,d,e),(a,b,c,e,d),(a,b,d,e,c)}. Notice that using this rule, we have that C'({a,b}) = {a,b,c,d,e} since once we obtain from {a,b} the "d" we can use the rule with {a,d} to obtain "e," which is not equal to K({a,b}) since we cannot apply this rule to the K operator. Finally, I mention that consequence operators can be generated by set-theoretic definition. For example, see Definition 2.4 operator C'(X,Y) in this archived paper. The operator K would falsify the general GGU-model hypotheses if one demonstrates that natural-system behavior follows the patterns predicted by the K operator. But, this is not the only way to falsify the general GGU-model hypotheses. If one can demonstrate that natural-system behavior as predicted by the consequence operator C'(X,Y), where Y is an infinite subset of a scientific language, then since C'(X,Y) is not a finite consequence operator it would also falsify the general GGU-model hypotheses.
[I assume for this section that you are familiar with the books contents and language.] Why are the illustrations on the pages for universe construction somewhat difficult to comprehend? The necessity to have alterations in the basic constructions and that any detailed instructions are contained in the incomprehensible ultranatural theories and ultranatural laws are the basic reasons why our comprehension must remain extremely partial and vague. I have done the best that I can, at this time, in illustrating what can be known. [The type of pre-design depends upon the interpretation. These constructions can yield the same results as discussed on page 172, the pure random subparticle combinations. This is the weakest form of intelligent design. On the other hand, the "or allowed" statement (page 122) can be interpreted as an intelligently guided more purposeful construction. Hence, there is a choice as to the type of pre-design that you're willing to accept philosophically. Among all of the libraries that generate the universes, there is a library where the basic describable natural processes that coalesce the universe-wide frozen-frames remain unchanged after realization. This seems to be the type of universe in which we dwell. The operators that model this coalescence of "natural-system" behavior do not change and still have intelligent agent signatures. 3/1/06] (I have not shown in this book how to use subevent sequences (i.e. subdevelopment paradigms) to generate the members of the library {w_j}. If you are interested in this aspect, I discuss it in the article course11.htm.
[4] Pages 80-81. The actual hypotheses for the GGU-model can be stated in technical terms. The major hypothesis is that the formation and behavior of each real natural-system is controlled or sustained by a specific set of significant general ultralogical processes as mathematically model. Mathematically, general ultralogical processes are (1) objects that satisfy the standard and nonstandard consequence operator axioms, the ultralogics. (2) The finite, hyperfinite, and general standard and nonstandard choice operators. (3) The process of combining finitely or hyperfinitely many objects into a single configuration. These are considered as physical processes that are modeled by mathematical "operators." Since "human mental" processes originally model each of these processes, then the GID interpretation yields the logic-system characteristics being displayed by these operators. (For an intuitive discussion of what the hyperfinite means relative to a higher intelligence, see hyperfinite.htm.) 1/18/06, 10/12/06
[5] Page 91. On this page, I mention that a complete and detailed logic-system need not, yet, exist. The logic-system is a technical device that may or may not exist in its entirety as "images". If it is not entirely expressed, then if one is seeking any new conclusion from a set of premises, whatever they may be, one "assumes" it exists. The reason for this that technically we do not usually have at the start of most investigations a complete set of rules of inference generated by the so-called natural laws along with the rules for acceptance of empirical evidence, the rules for experimental inquiry etc. We actually are constructing a more complete and "specific" logic-system from assumed previous logic-system rules of inference. (In mathematics, one often assumes that something exists and then, if possible, you construct or give specific examples.) The facts are that we usually are concerned with only a small portion of these other assumed rules of inference. One accepts a conclusion based upon various factors one of which is verification or that the "logical" argument mirrors previously accepted logical arguments. As I point out in the book, in a practical sense, logic-systems correspond to consequence operators and conversely.
Here is an example that shows how general is the notion of logic-systems and why this notion has such a wide range of application. Suppose that you state that "images" that are numbered from 1 to 500 when taken together yield image 501, 502, ..., 510. Then this previous sentence generates a logic-system composed of ten 501-tuple elements. In order to avoid any further discussion as to why this may be the case, you state that this as but an empirical statement based upon your observation. If you don't wish to be a one member science-community, it's hoped that others would observe the same result. However, if no one else makes such an observation, then this does not erase the logic-system the "images" generate. It may still be very significant to you. I will not argue for this notion since I consider, from examples, the assumed existence of logic-systems as self-evident. (6/27/04)
[6a] Page 93. The developmental paradigm as here defined does not include any "subsidiary information" that may be included in those that appear in some of my older papers such as in Herrmann (1886b). The present restriction allows the developmental paradigms to be more closely associated with the event sequence notion. Statements involving these previous types of developmental paradigms can often be modified so as to include only the properties of these restricted developmental paradigms. (4/24/07)
[6] Pages 100- . Relative to the general intelligent design interpretation (GID), the actual rules of logic used by H and H may not be known. On the other hand, they may be informally known such as informal set theory. The following is shown in General Logic-systems and Consequence Operators The H "metalogical" rules need not be explicitly stated as long as the "arguments" for certain conclusions are accepted by science-communities. The conclusions can come from both inductive processes through observation or other means or by pure deduction using an explicit set of rules. This yields an informal "scientific theory" that is intelligently designed by an H and, when applicable as viewed from the nonstandard physical world, intelligently designed by H. However, such arguments lead to a formal definition of a general logic-system and the general rules of inference, which is a slight generalization of the logic-system notion as discussed in this book. It is shown in the references paper that the notion of the finite consequence operate is equivalent to the notion of the general logic-system. Hence, there is a finite consequence operator that corresponds to the informal theory and becomes an intelligent agent that is intelligently designed.
The vast majority of physical-scientists consider the descriptions as not mere models for behavior, but descriptions for how nature actually behaves. One quotation is all that is necessary. Richard Feynman states relative to QED, "I am describing to you how nature works. . . ." (Feynman, Richard P., "QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter," Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 10.) From this viewpoint, the behavior predicted by the intelligently designed natural laws and scientific theories is intelligently designed since such behavior is the result of application of consequence operators. [Note: The signatures used for GID and that indicate intelligent design always include, by definition, the results of consequence operator application. The only necessary additional requirement is that the described results correspond to reality.] This also includes the behavior of individual events that follow probabilistic models where each individual event is considered "random." There exist intelligently designed intelligent agents that control the realization of each such event. [See, Ultralogics and Probability Models. There are articles on this website relative to the notion of "randomness." For one discussion of this notion, you may wish to consider randomness. 10/27/06
[7] Pages 113-115. I thought it was self-evident that the presented line segment diagrams are very partial in character. It is obvious to me, anyway, that an alteration in the master tape takes place at tag T + s (i.e. the segment from T to T + s) and an alteration or duplication of the master tap can continue to occur on the right of the diagram where there appears to be a blank space. I might have indicated this by dashed line segments. For the first line segment diagram on page 114 (and for all the others), this could be indicated as follows:
[7a] As indicated by this and the other constructions, alterations in natural-system behavior include the "null" (i.e. no) alteration. Indeed, one can consider alterations in characteristics being the next image. (5/15/06)
[8] Page 117. In the original version, as indicated under typographical variations, what I thought was self-evident can be better understood by inserting the indicated phrase although this addition is technically unnecessary when the next sentence is adjoined. From the windows point of view, one simply needs software that allows for a "clipboard" to retain an image. The image that is inserted is simply copied to the clipboard, the original image in the W file being altered is deleted at a position T + s and the clipboard image is then copied to the T + s position. But there is an additional step performed by the software. I state that the "same" image can be inserted. There appears to be no reason for inserting the same image and indeed this gives you redundant file names. So, assume that only images that are different are inserted and then the altered file is accorded a new file name. [In the original version, remove the phrase "the same or" from line 6.] Remember that these methods for displaying alterations in the master file are algorithms and they apply to each and every altered file, as it's often stated, "in like manner." The three methods (algorithms) I've presented for "universe construction" are only intended to indicate that such pre-design can be intelligently designed. Due to the ultranatural theories, ultranatural laws and ultranatural events, the actual method for such a construction is probably beyond our capacity to describe or comprehend.
****Of course, the three modes that allow for a pre-design and that include participator alterations are intended to serve a specific purpose. The modes are selected in the hopes that, at the least, one will be understandable. They are not intended to represent the exact way that a library of branches (i.e. universes) is pre-designed. They are intended to model only basic behavior. But, each one verifies the following statements as fact. Please note that in the simplest cases, the images actually exist in one form or another. Inductive generalization can be applied and many statements made. It is scientifically rational to assume that the natural and ultranatural behavior of every natural-system within a universe is pre-designed by a higher intelligence. Further, as done by many science-communities, a positive language can be employed. This means that the "scientifically rational to assume" is deleted. Then one can alter this statement and be less specific. For example, for the GID-model interpretation, such rationally constructed statements can be (1) Event sequences are intelligently designed. (2) Event sequences are intelligently pre-designed. (3) Event sequences are intelligently designed by a higher intelligence. (4) Event sequence are intelligently pre-designed by a higher intelligence.**** 2/28/02 [There is a formal definition for these illustrations. It is defined in soemwhat complex PDF paper events.pdf where its relation to the actual definition used to generate the strict mathematical GGU-model is discussed in detail. For a less complex discussion for significant and special types of event sequences, where one can have zero observe time but nonzero primitive time, please see the PDF file zerotime.pdf. 5/3/06 and 6/8/07]There are various aspects of the GGU-model cosmogony that must generally remain vague as to their details. One of these is the notion of a basic universe. This is pre-designed collection of natural and ultranatural events (images) that, in a vague manner, might be considered as satisfying the general requirements of a specific ultranatural theory as comprehended by a higher intelligence. In the same manner, allowable alterations of the basic universe form the branches of a specific library. Once again, in a vague manner, one might consider these alterations as satisfying the general requirements of a specific ultranatural theory as comprehended by a higher intelligence.
There can, of course, be many basic universes and many corresponding libraries. The information that generates each universe and its allowable alterations is contained in various ultrawords. At present, I don't consider it useful to speculate as to the images that comprise these other basic universes since they are governed by ultranatural theories. However, as has been established, there is a standard and an ultralogic unification for all of the knowable scientific theories that appear to govern the workings of our specific universe. For our universe, these unifications can be stated in terms of certain fixed parameters and the ultralogic unification is an example of an ultranatural theory, an ultranatural theory that generates a basic universe with all of its allowable alterations. Clearly, from experience within our universes, not all alterations appear to be allowed although as Wheeler claims under extreme enough circumstances many more alterations than presently accepted could prove viable.
I mention that there are "hierarchy" or "phase difference" multi-universe models. Let each universe (i.e. library) be governed by the same ultralogic unification that governs our universe with allowable parameter variations and suppose you choose such a hierarchy multi-universe model. Then in this case, it is easily deduced that if enough such universes are formed then it is highly probable that one would form having the exact appearance as the one in which we dwell. However, this does not invalidate any general aspect of the GGU-model's physical or intelligent designed interpretations. It simple gives you another choice from many different choices all of which satisfy the exact same physical evidence. 7/28/04
[9] Page 130. In the statement that I have made in the first full paragraph that "I've absolutely no idea how . . . " it would be better to remove confusion that "anything" be replaced by "many things." As previously indicated, my "scientific" pure positivistic approach is related only to the notion of what "forces" natural-systems to behave in a specific manner and to aspects of the subatomic region. It is a much "deeper" how than usually considered within scientific discourse. It's the illustrations of how universes can be pre-designed, how probabilistic behavior is obtained by intelligent agents, how participator alterations are controlled, how I technically describe subparticles, how "natural laws" that others and I consider as human inventions come into being, etc. What is absolute fact is that the GGU-model predicts rational behavior and rationally generates general statements about such "hows." But, the "actual" mechanisms most certainly need not be those presented. 2/23/03
[10] Pages 139-140. The unification presented on these pages in both versions is not the only ultralogic unification. This first unification presented in both versions is a unification for all physical theory behavior as would be predicted by the set of all physical theories. From the viewpoint of general design theory, this is much more important than constructing a humanly comprehensible grand unification theory. However, the first unification presented requires various special restrictions to obtain and does not present a single unifying ultralogic. A published new result, mentioned in the first revision, removes all of these restrictions and shows that there is a single hyperfinite ultralogic U that unifies all physical theory behavior. [This operator is denoted as omega on pages 167-168 in the first revision.] This ultralogic can also unify collections of physical theories if they are presented in a certain refined manner in the sense that there would be a hyperfinite logic-system that generates such a unifying ultralogic. Further, such a single ultralogic can be applied to various relativized physical theories. You will find the actual mathematics itself in this paper (www.serve.com/herrmann/0205073v6.pdf or www.arXiv.org/abs/physics/0205073). There is a fundamental difference between the ultralogic U and the original one I discovered. Although the original one required various restrictions to achieve [see below], we have more information as to its behavior than we do for U. Notwithstanding this fact, I consider U more significant in character. Further, there has been discovered a non-restricted standard unification for the set of all physical theories (see page 12, Theorem 5.1 and the paragraph that follows or go to this paper at the archives or on this website this paper). This standard unification has application to an expanded version of the minimum physical scenario. Last revision 1/23/07.
As of the date of this paragraph, these are the basic operators that can be interpreted as displaying intelligent design features. *S, P_p, PI_Pp, the special external operators H and H and the special general random operator D' discussed below. For each science-community logic-system, these are the individual S_N (or similar ones) and their extensions *S_N. But, these can be replaced with three different unifications. For the set A of all individual S_N, a standard unifications V_xA (= U_1). Then for the *S_N, either the extension *V_w or the pure hyperfinite extension U. At this time, there is no way to determine whether *V_w or U is the most appropriate. 4/8/04
[11] Page 139. A logic-system generated by an ultralogic is, in general, not the same as a logic-system used in this book to generate a consequence operator. Any consequence operator generates a set of rules R of inference that can be used to generate again the same consequence operator.
These rules are often expressed in a manner different from the original set of rules. Consequently, if a consequence operator is obtained originally by a finite set of rules R', then R need not be the same as R'.
The first discussed unifying ultralogic, unifies all physical theories in a special manner. This is a "general" unification. Although this unification does require that descriptions for natural laws and logical axioms be present to generate changes in natural-system behavior, the final result is a relativized unification. If no natural laws are included in the image X, then the difference between the image S_N^V(X) and the image X can be considered as an image that represents only the original natural-system, including any changes, and nothing more nor less. As mentioned, the set of rules of inference that generates this relativized operator are probably different from the original set of rules of inference. Revised 1/1/03
[12] Page 142, 147. I point out that subparticles yield an absolute "realism" philosophy of science in that all of the characterizing properties for elementary particles and combinations thereof are "real" characteristics and are covirtually present prior to the application of the standard part operator. This helps to eliminate an absurd quantum measure theory interpretation as to how such characteristics come into being. As a primitive, specific information is "something" associated with an image that "forces" subparticles to form various configurations. It's these configurations that we eventually experience. However, there is ultranatural specific information. It is not possible to know which came first ultranatural specific information that would yield associated ultranatural physical theories and ultranatural events, or whether a type of "higher" language, as stated here, yields ultranatural physical theories and these are what "forces" ultranatural and natural events to be configured (i.e. yields the quality I term as standard specific information). But, this does not change this ordering at the level of human experience. I still accept that the primitive quality termed as standard specific information configures what we
first experience in the natural world and the regularities we call natural laws are then a product of these experiences. 6/12/02 (p. 147) The finite consequence operator denoted here by P_p, and used for distributions has a special intuitive property, among others. From the proof of theorem 2.1 in Probability Models and Ultralogics, the P_p is equivalent to applying, one at a time so to speak, the event or not event consequence repeatedly. This is what would be observed in the natural world. The theorem actually shows that it is rational to argue for a result that only involves a hyperfinite choice operator. Once the actual form of P_p is established, then it can be generated by application of hyperfinite choice. 10/19/2006
[13] Pages 153-154. The C' operator discussed in this section is the C operator defined in reference Herrmann, R. A. 1987, Definition 2.4 (i) and used in Herrmann, R. A. 1999(b) (page 10, second paragraph), and elsewhere. In the most general case where no other probabilistic model is known, one may be able to calculate the probability that an event will occur if the number of all possible events is known and it is believed that each event is equally likely to occur. Using such specified knowledge, this equally likely probabilistic model can be considered as produce by a C' type operator. But, one most have the specified knowledge and accept the below defined notion of general randomness. However, in all cases, independent of any other behavioral model, there is an underlying rather weak consequence operator that can be rationally assumed to represent a physical process or an intelligent agent that guides such behavior. This operator also satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 1 on page 14 of Herrmann, R. A. 1999(b).
Consider any appropriate language L (including images). Let M be a member of L and be a statement (this is to be conceived of as an informational image) that gives various physical characteristics for a physical entity. Suppose that X is a member of L that is not equivalent to M and also lists a set of physical characteristics for some entity. Consider the consequence operators generated by the logic-systems {(M,X)}. Consider any nonempty finite set of these logic-systems {(M,X_i)}, i = 1,...,n. Then consider the consequence operator D defined by the logic-system {(M,X_i)|i=1,...,n}. D is a consequence operator and is the same as the union operator required to satisfy Theorem 1. To see this, let A be any subset of L such that M is a member of A and C_i be the consequence operator generated by each {(M,X_i)}. Then D(A)= A U {X_1,...,X_n}= (A U {X_1}) U . . . U (A U {X_n}) = C_1(A) U . . . U C_n(A). Now if M is not a member of A, then D(A) = A = C_1(A) U . . . U C_n(A), since each C_i(A)= A. If you now consider a non-empty finite collection of M type descriptions and the set of simple consequence operators, C_j, generated by the logic-systems that contain but the single ordered pair, then defining D' in the same manner but allowing the M to vary, it follows by a simple induction proof that D' is a union consequence operator generated by the collection {C_j}. This is one of the signatures for general random behavior. [It is also possible to extend D' to a hyperfinite ultralogic if required.] Hence, since M can be fixed and X vary, we can use these consequence operators in place of the C' and they too have the discussed significant hidden signature.
These results are related to all natural-system behavior that is altered in primitive time. One can rationally assume that H intelligently designs natural-systems that suffer time dependent alterations in characteristics. And, there are underlying special intelligent agents that mediate these alterations and logically unite universe-wide frozen-frames. These special intelligent agents are only revealed when there are no other comprehensible intelligent agents that control and unite primitive time dependent alterations in specific natural-system behavior or characteristics.
Application of this general D' type underlying operator is relative to the notion of general randomness. This philosophic concept can be defined as done by Bohm (Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, Harper & Sons (1957)), where he discusses limited context randomness. He states ". . . it is not considered as being arbitrary and lawless relative to a certain limited and definite context, but rather as something that is so in all possible contexts." Relative to human comprehension and operationally, this means that there is no language, no theory, that will "ever" be able to predict the exact occurrence of an event. In the case discussed in the book, if you have one event, then this would apply to any other event in a finite sequence of events. However, the D' operator yields the same signature for this merging of any two universe-wide frozen-frames. Although it may seem unnecessary to many physical science-communities, I discuss on page 162-163 that fact that it is rational to assume that every member of a universe-wide frozen-frame, every natural-system, has a unique identifier, as does each universe-wide frozen-frame. If the above consequence operator D' is obtained by letting the M vary over all of the natural-systems in one universe-wide frozen frame, then the X can represent possible altered behavior or characteristics that appear in a different universe-wide frozen-frame at a different moment of primitive time. [As mentioned, if for various reasons there might be infinitely many different logic-systems {(M,X)}, then there is a much less trivial pure ultralogic that can take the place of the D' operator.] Primitive time is defined technically on pages 65-66 of my book "The Theory of Ultralogics" found at this URL
[13a] Page 164. Lines 3-4. The statement that the "DVD_2 has the exact same images at and before |_T as those contained in DVD_1" also holds in general, for the DVD illustration, for any change to another DVD. This algorithm means that for any moment in primitive time the DVD being realized contains all of the previously realized images. Hence, the activated DVD also acts as a "history" file. 3/17/08
[13b] Page 169. In this book, I generally discuss the operator *S. Other information can be obtained from investigating the operator *S_N. In particular, it is from such scientific theory generating consequence operators and the logic-systems that generate them, that it has been shown that there can exist objects that behavior like natural laws, but would only apply to only the substratum but would indirectly affect a physical universe. These objects are called "ultranatural" laws. Other investigations also lead to objects that behave like physical objects but again are within the substratum. The model automatically generates some of the properties of these predicted objects. These properties have led to the theory of subparticles.
[14] Page 183. For the minimum physical scenario, I have only mentioned two standard types of consequence operators (logic-systems) that indicate an intelligent design, at least, on the level of human intelligence. However, there are more. Indeed, in note [13], I defined a weak logic-system and associated consequence operators that yield a weak underlying logical pattern that would indicate that "random" behavior is, at least, weakly designed by an intelligent agent. If it is assumed that in actual practice only a finite number of events can occur that would yield a partial sequence of relative frequencies, then in Herrmann (2001(b), p. 323) (arXiv p. 4) a single standard consequence operator is displayed that yields such a sequence. The same holds for the case of distributions. Thus, such finite probabilistic behavior is also the product of "standard" intelligent agents. Finally, as mentioned in note [10], there is also a non-restricted standard unification for the set of all physical theories. Hence, for the minimum physical scenario, it is rational to assume that all "random" natural-system behavior, all probabilistic natural-system behavior and all such behavior predicted, in a general manner, by standard physical theories is produced, controlled or guided by "standard" intelligent agents. These agents display, at the least, the same level of intelligence as displayed by members of the various science-communities. In this minimum case, one can than determine from personal evidence whether this is but an apparent intelligence produced by some standard evolutionary process or the restriction of a "higher" intelligence. [For a further discussion of evidence, see [22a]]5/22/03 (Revised 9/30/03)
[15] Pages 189-210. This refers to the "And God said" sequence. In Genesis 1, there are nine such phrases but only eight are followed by an operative phrase beginning with the notion of "Let . . ." or "to become. . . ." The complete sequence requires such an operative phrase, which is again something I thought was self-evident. 2/28/02
[15a] Page 196. For a theological interpretation, the standard part operator is a signature for the realized "For he spake, and it was done." This phrase signifies that only one application is necessary to obtain the exact required results. The standard part operator, when applied to any collection of subparticles SP needed to generate a realized image, satisfies axioms (1), (2) and, for our finite universe, (3) on page 71. In general, it satisfies (1) and (2) and it is also "monotone." As used, it does not satisfy the last requirement for a consequence operator, noted on page 69, that P subset of TH(P). However, when an ultralogic is applied and the "hypotheses" are removed, then the standard part operator properties do model this restricted consequence operator process. Hence, one can trivially turn this operator into a consequence operator by simply adjoining the original collection of subaprticles to those obtained by its application. Recall, that the word used here for "spake" can apply to a "mental" type of command. 3/17/08
[16] Page 194, 200. I mention on these pages the vacuum of particle physics and the ZPF and the fact that these invisible entities "can be realized." All "invisible" subatomic entities can be realized via ultimate subparticles combining into intermediate subparticles, which have the characteristics of these entities. However, one can also have only the theories realized and not all of the actual entities. Subparticles can "jump over" many of these assumed entities and combine directly into entities that reveal themselves as gross matter. In this case, the theories become bookkeeping devices that allow us to predict behavior of gross matter via imaginary processes or entities that need not actually exist. Of course, whether one considers such entities as objectively real is a philosophic stance. 11/16/03
[16a] Page 202-214. There has now been developed two other types of "in-transit informations." The one discussed in this section is type (I). Further, there is yet another model for what occurred during and after the Flood. The new type (III), the "rapid-formation" model, along with a "hot firmament" beginning and the new Flood model satisfy all strictly interpreted Biblical statements related to Divine creation and the Flood as well as all present-day observable evidence for both a "young" and an "old" earth. These new research results can be found in my Personal Statements. 2/25/08
[17] Page 208. At the end of paragraph 1, I make the following statement: "This I interpret to mean that the entire physical universe present at that moment rather abruptly ceased to exist materially." The word "materially" is very significant since all of the pre-designed events sequences will always exist in covirtual form. When these Scriptural events occur there will be the usual conjoining of branches of a Genesis library.
[18] Page 210. One thing is certain, research is a continuous process and new deductions often develop after a book is published. I have taken this approach to make corrections or refinements to the original book so that a new edition would not be necessary. It seems that further considerations allow me to alter the notions discussed in the first full paragraph on this page. The change I purpose still verifies all associated Scripture. In the last line of that paragraph, the phrase "out of nothing" can be deleted. For further reasons for this slight alteration please see What Can Be Known 6/13/04
[19] Pages 210-213. For the theological interpretation mentioned, I have only briefly discussed the MA-model "aging" processes. I have been asked whether there is a simple explanation, based only upon event sequences, for the "hard evidence" for the existence of life-forms as represented by ancient artifacts and fossils found throughout our "local" environment. There is a possible MA-model styled explanation that appears here, I think, for the first time. It need not be the case that such evidence indicates the actual realization of ancient life-forms. There are covirtual event sequences that would yield such evidence but these sequences are only realized at the time of the Flood. This would be consistent with the in-transit information model and the hot firmament model with removal of any morphing boundary. There is a definite purpose for this as well. Such evidence indicates what "would have been" the case if our local environment had not been created originally to develop in a very special manner. There is Scriptural evidence for this aging process. God states in Genesis 6: 13 "I will destroy them (together) with the earth." The actual meaning of the term here translated as "destroy," relative to the earth, should be "ruin." There are pre-design branches of the Genesis sequence that do, indeed, "ruin" the originally created special aspects of the earth and, most probably, the solar system. A shift to one of these branches would remove all the "obvious" evidence that such a special pre-flood local environment existed. This shift is made so that, after the Flood, the natural-system behavior within the local environment appears consistent with the designed evolutionary processes that govern the development of the exterior universe. This type of alteration in our local environment would be a one-time event as indicated in Genesis 8:22 and 9:11. The next such alteration will be to the entire universe as indicated in Revelations 20:11 and 21:1.
The branch chosen would contain certain anomalies within our local environment that cannot be entirely reconciled with any described standard evolutionary mechanism. This would be a signature, for those who can discern such anomalies, that God created our original local environment in a special form as indicated within the Scriptures and the development of certain entities within, at least, our local environment cannot be satisfactorily explained by means of any internally displayed and described "natural" mechanism. For many individuals, a selection of such a branch would form part of the "strong delusion" that God said He would "send." Such a deception is accorded those that "received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved." (revised 9/20/03)
For additional information as to what I personally accept theologically, please consider my three personal statements at this URL.
[20] Page 214. I no longer believe that the formation of the external universe, for the hot firmament model, occurred during day-three. It seems more probable, to me anyway, that it occurred during day-four, the day that other objects external to the "earth" appeared. This does not alter the observer time notion of "sudden appearance" during
day-four since as pointed out "sudden" appears to be greater than instantaneous in certain cases. There are actually three types of time involved in the hot firmament model, primitive, observer and earth-time. Earth-time is time measured via any extremely periodic earth-bound natural-system behavior. It is a restricted form of observer time. It's earth-time that corresponds to the creation-day notion. I am not sure that for the hot firmament model it really matters greatly whether star and, possibly, all other solar system members (i.e. not the earth) where formed during day three or day-four. What's significance is the purposes stated in the day-four description. 12/14/02 (revised 5/31/04, 03/14/2005)
[21] Page 216. I thought it was self-evident as to whom I am referring by the phrase "the deity is God as He is described by a literal Biblical interpretation." As an Apostolic, I firmly believe that the deity that has created all there was, all there is, and all there ever will be has a personal name. This name is clearly identified in the New Testament as "Jesus." 9/7/02
[22a] [Technical Additions]. For a discussion of actual direct and indirect scientific evidence for the GID-model interpretation see Evidence.
[22b] Because this book is written for an audience without advanced technical training, I have styled the material as it would apply mostly to a simple universe (book p. 101) and a single final event sequence. The facts are that the actual "final" covirtual image that appears at time t and to which subparticle formation and the standard part operator is applied is obtained by means of a much more technical process where we can't have a detailed explanation for all that occurs. This is a rather technical explanation that uses my book The Theory of Ultralogics Part II referred to below as II. I use terminology taken from this mathematics book. In this version of my ultralogics book, there is a typographic error on page 68. In the paragraph exactly before Theorem 7.3.4, each w '_ i should be replaced with w_i.
In section 7 before this paragraph, the event sequences are restrict
to intervals of the form [t(j),t(j+1)). These sequences are composed of a strictly increasing sequence of primitive time identifiers that converge to t(j+1) (II p. 61). Each one of the frozen segments (i.e. frozen-frames) that correspond to each identifier is taken from a totality and the totalities are contained in a denumerable set of totalities denoted by (script)T. Since the entire collection of countably many such intervals forms a countable collection of denumerable sets, it can be viewed technically as an event sequence d. This is why the term sequence is used. The bijection that yields such a sequence is not used in my ultralogics book. However, the inverse of this map allows one to locate all of the sequentially denoted members of d that correspond to each member of [t(j),t(j+1)). Thus, the sequence-generating map is but a modeling artifact. [Hence, the d can always be viewed as being expressed in the original primitive time order.] Each of these intervals generates an ultraword w_i.The ultraword for a specific natural-system that generates its event sequence d is actually an ultimate ultraword w '_ j obtained by application of Theorem 7.3.4 to this countable collect of ultrawords. In the book, I call these event sequence generators - ultrawords. To investigate what is occurring about a specific t(j+1), one simply applies Theorem, 10.1.1 (II p. 89). I point out that, in general, it is not necessary to consider the d as related to such time intervals. In this case, one simply applies Theorem 9.1.2. Also, note that the nonstandard event sequence generated by ultraword w_i is hyperfinite and, hence, from the viewpoint of a higher intelligence has all of the formal behavior of a "finite" set.
As is well-known there are members of the ultrawords w_i to which *S applies where the primitive time identifies correspond to infinite Robinson numbers with their usual ordering. Further, depending upon the exact members of the original d, the following holds. (i) If an original "converging" portion of d restricted to one of these intervals is composed of "repeated" images that converge in standard primitive time to a specific interval end-point, then the corresponding nonstandard members of *d only differ in that they now require a Robinson styled infinite number primitive time identifier. If this is not the case and the images for various reasons are considered as non-repeated, then these nonstandard members of *d not only have Robinson styled infinite number identifiers but the actual "images" themselves may be difficult or even impossible to "describe." These are the ultranatural events. Unless you can characterize in a special way each member of such a d interval in terms of our standard model, then there is no method that gives us any idea as to the content of these ultranatural events, these pure nonstandard frozen segments.
It's important to remember that these processes are for the generation of many distinct universes. Although within our universe the outcomes of the entire universe generating process may appear to some scientists to be discontinuous in character within certain subatomic regions, it has been shown (II p. 77) and Herrmann (1987) that within the substratum this can be the product of hypercontinuous behavior. There are particle field theories that also imply such sequences of altered behavior, at the least, as to "location." Then, of course, we have the hypothesized general behavior of the "vacuum" of particle physics. Hence, within our present universe the event sequence frozen-frames that generate certain w_i do display an infinite sequence of different frozen-frames. In all cases, the ultranatural events would be, within the substratum, (nonstandard) hyperprimitive time infinitesimally close to standard t(j+1). Under the definitions used in the physical interpretation, these events indirectly affect the frozen-fame image at t(j+1).
[22c] When the final (book) ultimate ultraword composed of the above defined event sequence ultrawords is decompressed, you do not have just a single ultraword for a given natural-system but you have a countable collection that can be considered as partitioned. This yields at time t a countable collection of covirtual images, (information) for each specific natural-system. It is at this stage that other appropriate intelligent agents coalesce and yield the appropriate image from this collection that corresponds to the "previous" image. This is particular required so as to preserve the probabilistic outcomes and, where appropriate, the macroscopic and large scale regularities. This is followed by subparticle formation and realization via the standard part operator. However, other aspects of the coalescence cannot be described since they would be associated with the ultranatural events. This process yields an actual realized observer event sequence through and including the time t event. The way the actual model is constructed for a non-simple universe at time t, all natural-systems that exist at t have event sequences for the behavior prior to t.
The GGU-model can be used to obtain event sequences that yield increasing, suspended or decreasing observer time. However, accept for Divine intervention, I reject, for our universe, any notion that there may be realizations that reverse the forward arrow of observer time. I consider all such natural-system "backward in time" notions as but modeling artifacts. However, when realization occurs for such a observer time arrow, the next realization in primitive time sequence ordering, due to this time notion, must become the only realized image. The information that produces the "previous" realizations can be assumed to still exist as a covirtual objects. They can be considered as forming a type of natural-system history file. For the theological interpretation, these can be important objects. They can be retained in the form of compressed ultrawords that contain all of the "prior" information as to the actual real behavior of any natural-system. Biblically, the natural-system ultrawords, from any past, that comprise an individual's life and an "immediate" environment can be used to verify the rationality of Rev. 20:12 - 13. They can form the "book of life."