

The United States Naval Academy

Mathematics Department
572 Holloway Rd.
Annapolis, MD 21402-5002

Dr. Robert A. Herrmann
w:[410] 267-3703
FAX [410] 267-4883
e-mail g04047@n1.usna.navy.mil

August 16, 1993

Dennis Wagner - Editor
Origins Research
P O Box 38069
Colorado Springs, CO 80937-8069

Dear Editor:

Please find enclosed a "Letter to the Editor" which I would like considered for publication in your next "Origins Research."

Sincerely,

Robert A. Herrmann
Professor

Letter to the Editor:

I present a few important comments relative to the article "The whole question of metaphysics" by Paul Nelson (15(2) Spring/Summer 1993) and the continual falsehoods present by many members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. A vast amount of what is called "science" is theoretical science. A theoretical model is first created for what is claimed are processes the yield natural system behavior. After such a human construct, concrete evidence is sought within the natural world that will tend to establish *indirectly* that the model *might be* scientifically viable.

In order to ensure rationality and the like, a basic method for model construction is to associate it with a mathematical structure. Terms taken from a specific physical discipline language are associated with entities within the mathematical structure. A theoretical physical model is then constructed in complete accordance with the behavior of the corresponding mathematical structure. This approach thereby yields a mathematical model for natural system behavior.

In August 1979, John Wheeler personally presented to me what he claimed were the two most important questions on the books of physics: How did the universe come into being and of what is "empty space" composed? I answered these questions by constructing a mathematical model based upon certain fundamental aspects of the scientific method. Whereas the mathematical model called Quantum Measure theory is based upon the easily described laws of simple and complex human observation, the concrete and everyday experiences I chose to model are possibly the most fundamental of scientific experiences. I chose to model mathematically the basic linguistic principles of scientific discourse itself. I had created a previous mathematical theory called the theory of ultralogics and adjoined to this theory the additional concept of describing natural events in a time ordered sequence, among other simple human processes such as finite choice. Later I discovered that this model also logically verifies an idea expressed by deBroglie: "[T]he

structure of the material universe has something in common with the laws that govern the working of the human mind.”

The mathematical model thus created — the MA-model — answers all of Wheeler’s questions and provides additional significant conclusions when interpreted in a physical language. No “philosophical” argument can force a rejection of this theoretical model. This scientific model can only be rejected by the scientific community on two grounds: the mathematical structure contains mathematical errors as judged by the mathematical community or the physical interpretation is inconsistent. As of the writing of this letter, no such errors or inconsistencies have been found, and hence, this model remains scientifically viable.

I point out that the conclusions obtained from the MA-model are not based upon any other presupposed or hidden axioms. It is constructed from the axioms of the most widely used set-theory by application of the most widely accepted mathematical methods. The physical axioms model a few of the actual methods employed within scientific communication and nothing more. The results that are automatically obtained from this model are somewhat startling and have a profound affect upon the concepts discussed by Nelson.

A theoretical scientific model is a logical construct. Whether or not there is any evidence either within human experience or otherwise that leads to the acceptance of the model as “true in reality” is not relative to the acceptance of the model as a useful “scientific possibility.” The MA-model has numerous submodels that do correspond to what many have claimed are nonscientific models. The existence of these submodels refutes such claims. Although the MA-model is exceptionally multifaceted in its applications, I only describe a few aspects that are pertinent to the Nelson article.

All natural system behavior is inter-related. The human mind cannot logically comprehend nor describe in any detail many of these inter-relations. All natural system behavior is controlled and sustained by an “ultra-uniformity” and an “ultra-

intelligence.” When the ultra-uniformity is restricted to the behavior of certain natural systems, the behavior can be described as a humanly comprehensible form of uniform behavior.

With respect to the quoted statements made by Kenneth Miller, a conclusion from the MA-model almost substantiates his statement that “Nature is a lot more intricate and a lot more complex than anything yet fashioned by the mind or the hand of man.” But the model contradicts the intent of his use of the word “yet.” Replace this word by the phrase “that can be” and you have a MA-model conclusion. The MA-model also refutes his contention that due to “obvious flaws, mistakes and redundancies” one should not accept “intelligent design.” Miller’s statement depends upon an interpretation of the word “intelligent.” The MA-model specifically describes an ultra-intelligence. A restriction of this ultra-intelligence to the behavior of certain natural systems or portions thereof yields what can be described as a humanly comprehensible intelligent design concept. On the other hand, this same restriction can yield what “appears” to be behavior that does not follow from any humanly comprehensible intelligent design concept or hypothesis although an hypothesis does exist that fully “explains,” in terms of ultra-logical processes, the “reasons” for these apparent “flaws.”

With respect to the theory of abrupt or sudden appearance, there are numerous MA-submodels from which to choose. Sudden changes can be minuscule in character where, at a particular moment during the development of a natural system, there can occur sudden changes in the humanly comprehensible patterns of the development of a natural system that would be described as minuscule if they could be measured by means of natural instrumentation. Or the behavior could change entirely from the viewpoint of human comprehension. In this case, one possibility states that there is no natural instrumentation that can detect either the change itself or give any information as to the behavior of the natural system prior to the sudden change. The maximum scenario states that an entire natural system can appear in any

structured form at any moment and this appearance is not produced by any natural process or any change in any other natural system. Further, all of these changes or appearances take place in an ultra-uniform manner.

I have stated that the remarks made by many members of the AAAS are falsehoods. Indeed, those individuals that make false statements relative to creation-science cannot claim ignorance of the facts since the conclusions of MA-model research have been widely published in various scientific journals since 1981.

In the last part of his article, Nelson puts forth the question: "can science infer a creator?" If this question is restated as "can theoretical science infer a creator," then, depending upon the attributes you accept as those of a creator, the answer is "yes" for there are MA-submodels that, when theological interpreted, do describe attributes that directly correspond to "creator" attributes. Thus as Nelson states it, "The question then becomes not whether creation can be science, but which creation theory best handles the evidence."

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